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The relativity of theory 
I The discipline of public administration is not quite the same, in Europe 
as it is in North-:-America. The reasons are, obvious andgene;rally known. 
There, its roots are in administrative law; here, they are in political 
science: It could hardly be 'otherwise. It follows from the acc~pted 
base of public office, as relating to the state. In Europe, the state 
used to be conceived primarily as a legal system. On this side of the 
Atlantic, especially in the United States, it is conceived primarily as 
, (poli t-ical) power' system. 
The notable fact is that evidently both conception's of public ad-
ministration are time-and-place-conditioned. From this it follows that 
neither conception is necessarily releva~t to other times and/or places. 
The consequence is easy to draw, but it is not always noted. 
A fundamental question emerges. It refers to the demonstrable 
generality of insight regarding public administration. IS,itgeneral; 
if so ,ho.wgeneral? The question is doubtlessly awkward; i tt,akes things 
back to zero point. Nobody in his right mind would be keen to, raise it: 
Nor is' there, normally, much occasion to consider rais,ing it. In American 
writings, the chance of its emerging is reduced by the lack of attention 
given ,to ~he non-American appearance of public administration. Nowadays 
the chance is diminished further due ,to a gradual shift in the European 
. approach, ~nder the~impactof .American \oIritings (perhaps those on management 
rathE;lr ,than those on public administration stricto sensu). On the other 
hand, the growing concern with comparative administ,ration and with develop-
ment administration..., the two g,oing ,hand in hand':'appearsj to be bound--
"to -'~~ise~-the question and,be'fo:r;e'long to make it appear as' a 'crucial 
one.' It' 'may" therefore' be . ''gppropJ:. {a.te: t~ iai ~~ =-rt here and:'nbw ,. in a-
conferen~e devoted ta 'public 'administratio:i:i'~-~d~mparative adnlinistration 
and, ~evelopment admini8tration' all tit, once. ,- " " 
The ambiguity of the term pubiicadministration 
It is generally known and recognized that the term "public admiriistration" 
is a~iguous. It refers to a complex of human activities, properly de-
fined~, It also refers to ,a body of scholarly insight, ,in other words 
theory, concerning this complex~ The ,assumption is that since the ambiguity 
is known, ,everybody is sufficiently alerted to it so that no ,harm can 
be done,. 
It would be easier to be at peace with this assumption were it not for 
one additl.onalsource of ambiguity. The complex of administrative activities 
in question has a referent that is indicated, somewhat obliquely and ineptly, 
by the adjective I,~public"~ The. intent is, cleai;,ly." that,public administr,ation 
illil . ...:the -ti'drninfstrat:i.oi1. '(French: 'gest-TanT 'of' pUblfca~~~s.-~:::,i3~!i:~heii," wha.t, exactly 
is public affairs? We ar~,back at square one. ' 
, At-thIs' point; however, it, pays' to specify thi3 root question in a 
manner different thari the law/power, dichotomy just mentioned. Let us s~y, 
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as is done oftentimes in the literatu~e, that it refers to politics. Ety-
mologically, this is correct. Public affairs is a correct translation into 
English of the Greek word that we render as "politics". However, there is 
more to this than meets the eye. The question remains to be aske,d in which 
sense politics, or public affairs, will be taken. 
There are two senses in which it can be taken. These are seldom 
distinguished: a circumstance that is the source of many diffi~ulties, not 
merely in: public administration but also in poli.tical science and the soCial 
sciences in general. When the Greeks talked politics they talked public 
affair~, and in: so doing they covered the full gamut of sociocultural'life. 
In other ,words, politics was a short-:-hand term denoting real:lty at large. 
A pars pro toto indication, perhaps.l On the other hand, when contemporary 
Westerriers talk politics they refer to one distinct aspect or segment of the 
totality of sociocultural life. Whatever this' aspect or segment is, it is 
not tl1e aspect or segment of religion, 'or that of economics, or that of 
culture - to mention only these. I submit that references to politics made 
in writings on public administration usually fail to clarify to which of 
the two different conceptions of pol.itics they refer, for lack of aware-
ness of or readiness to account for the difference. 
This would not be serious, except that·often references to politics 
mark the beginning of a series of further 'references, ever backward to 
"backdrop" phenomena, each time of a ,different, more gener'al or at, least 
less tangible, kind. These series have all the characterisitics ofa re-
gression. As a backdrop (or frame of reference) behind (or underlying) 
public administration, politics appears. In the same way a further backdrop, 
beyond politics, will be variably identified as goals, values or yet some-
thing else. Nor is this necessarily the end of the line. In principle this 
is a case of regression ad infinitum; but as a rule it will get bogged , 
down after two or three steps, in a reference that nobody cares to identifi'y 
or spell out any further, be it culture, philosophy, ideology or yet some-
thing else. 
Note now what the difference in the perception of politics does to 
a regressional sequence in which politics is the second instance. 'If it 
appears in the pars ~ tomsense, the regression is false: in presenting 
politics as a backdrop to pub11c affairs (as managed by means of public 
administration) it implicitly distinguishes ,between the two notwithstanding 
the fact that they are one and the same. (Sometimes, this kind'of conceptual 
reduplication, with ensuing differentiation between the two concepts 
employed, can be put to good analytic use; but in this case there is no 
trace of an attempt to this effect.) On the other hand, if the reference is 
to politics in the segmsntary sense, the regression appears valid at a 
first blush, but proves abortive in the last resort. The reason is that the 
regressiqn is bound to be ad infinitum. It is this that turns this latter 
case irito a roundabout variant of the former one, the false regression. 
Note furthermore that things are difficult in a,Western context 
because the distinction between politics in pars pro toto and politics in 
a segmentary sense is not customarily made. They are bound to be greatly 
more difficult in the context: of many so-called developing countries, 
where the overall politicization that tends to go hand ':bi. hand with the 
development urge tends to blur the distinction to the point of eliminating 
it. 
The provisional conclusion, none too encouraging, seems to be that 
in addition to being somewhat ambiguous, public administration is also 
somewhat elusive for purposes 'of proper definition. It is anchored on 
shifting ground. 
1. This added explanation is correct in retrospect only, from our viewpoint. 
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The quest for generality and how it is hampered 
In an attempt to obtain a firmer grip, it is now proposed to take a closer 
look at that which, in the regressional sequences just referred to, usually 
occupies the place of an Ultima Thule. As often as not, the ultimate link 
in the chain, almost indistinguishabie due to its remoteness, is culture or 
something to that effect. The very adoption of regressional sequences could 
make no sense if it did not mean that by simple reversion of the sequence 
one should be able to argue that culture, standing at the far end of the re-
gressional line, stands at the root, as a primary datum. The earlier re-
ference to European vis-a-vis American conceptions of public administration 
points in much the same direction: culture as a prime determinant of specifi-
city and, . through specificity, of variety. Culture as a main conditioning 
factor, both for action and for scholarship. 
Using this approach, let us once again cover the ground that we have 
provisionally covered in(the preceding. We shall look once more at admirtis-
stration and at public affairs. Then, we shall consider some other implica-
tions of culture as a frame of reference, a primary determinant of specifi-
city. 
I suggest that management, gesti6n, as one instance of objective 
(i.e., o·bject-directed) action, is' fundamentally culture-conditioned. 
In other words, my contention is that it is impossible to spell out what 
management,. once initially and tentatively defined, really means and entails, 
without explicit reference to the specific culture context in which it 
happens to be observed. Rephrasing t~is again more realistically, in 
attempting to estaBlish something like a "general", basic meaning of the 
concept, we are obliged to go out of 'our way, by "controlling for" the 
culture context (no doubt our own) i4 wh~ch we have just found it and tried 
to identify it. In other words once 4gain, the quest for generality will 
inevitably and necessarily involve a protracted and difficult exercise, for 
the simple yet seldom adequately recdgnized reason that what is with us 
from the outset is not generality but specificity. 
I will illustrate this by suggesting one possible approximation to the 
kind of exercise needed: the exercise of envisaging, and accounting for, 
cultural specificities (very much in the plural). It is possible to make a 
distinction, in the general realm of cultures, according to basic orientation 
in one .specific regard, the importance of which was brought home to me in 
my: 'studies of Indonesia, the Indian subcontinent and the Middle East ~ and 
that may well be significant elsewhere. There exist two perceptions of 
human action that are virtually one another's opposite number. According to 
one, actton is geared to systematic maximization of returns upon assiduous 
effort of man in regard to. everything (both human and non-human)around him. 
In this perspective, this context features necessarily as :the object under-
going action on the part of man as t~e subject: action as control and domi-
nation. According to the other, actiqn is one aspect or instance of inter-
action between man and context, geared to man's self-maintenance vis~a-vis 
context Action is culture in the true etymological sense of the word: 
cultivation rather than domination with no holds barred. It is .the exploita-
tion of opportunity when and where it is. experienced. For brief reference to 
the former, a ready-made label is available. This is the Promethean outlook 
and attitude. The latter has no customary name. The term "subsistence" . 
will describe it eloquently, if its meaning is appropriately widened and· 
deepened for the purpose: subsistence as a state of mind. 
It does not appear too far-fetched to suggest that in the contemporary 
Western setting, public administration will tend to reflect fairly closely 
the Promethean orientation. In the traditional setting of any medium- or 
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or small-size sociocultural unit outside of the Western orbit; it will verge 
towards the subsistence orientation. But it will appear as a - more or less 
uneasy - mix between the two opposite orientations in at least two other kinds 
of situations. One is the traditional realm or empire, whether early Western 
or non-Western. The other is the Western colony in a non-Western setting and 
its historical sequel, the non-Western developing country. T~is is not the 
occasion to spell out the operational implications of the typological distinctions 
introduced, beyond' pointing out that on the basis of two opposite. types a 
full range of typological variants can be built: not just three. The resulting 
analytic device is of considerable value, as will be argued below. 
As stated, this example represents no more than one possible first move'·· 
into the d~manding exerc:i,se that seeIIls to be in store for·us. Its main.use, in 
the present connection, is to suggest the fundamental nature. of the differ-
ences to which we can expect to be alerted, and for which we shall be able to 
account, once we make up our minds to take seriously the differences between 
cultures as basic frames of reference for the category of phenom~na with 
which we wish to be concerned. No doubt, we stand to be detracted; initially, 
from' that which interests us; the pay-off is that we shall work under much 
less of a handicap once we coine to grips with it. 
Turning once again to public affairs, there is more.to be noted than 
the already mentioned difference between the pars ~ toto and the segmentary 
perceptions, and the implications of this difference for our conception, and 
our understanding as resulting therefrom, of the. nature of the polity. 
An equally important distinction is usually left implicit and is thus 
hardly ever considered for its implications. It'runs between public and 
private affairs. . '
Along with its basic segmentation, already referred to, Western civi-
lization distinguishes between a private and a public sphere. This is done 
mainly by maintaining an optimally protected and indeed entrenched position, 
role and function for the nuclear family vis-a-vis society in all its other 
institutionalizations .No doubt the line .is occasionally.blurred ~ Some 
elements of law (for example, penal and 'inheritance provisio~s, provisions 
regarding marriage and divorce) extend the impact of the public domain into 
the family dwelling; in return some family prepogativesexpandwellbeyond 
its walls (for example, schools). In matters like loyalty and authority, the 
distinction is nonetheless quite effective. The resulting comp1ex provides 
a highly significant part of the parameter for Western public administration; 
so much so that the definition of, for example,. corruption follows immedia-
tely from available data, as a virtually self-evident matter. 
The distinction between a public and a private sphere is not the same 
everywhere, nor is. it equally hard-and-fast everywhere. For an almost dia-
metrically opposed state of aff~irs, we may refer to the kinship society of 
traditional Middle Eastern nomadism. There, the family - extended rather 
than nuclear - is merely the smallest, and thus the most tightly-knit, of a 
considerable range of kinship units of subsequent orders of magnitude, 
these being virtually the only units recognized. The difference between the 
private and the public spheres appears, in consequence, not as a clear 
bre.ak but rather as a gradual shift in accent. As a parameter for something 
like public'administration, this is an entirely different proposition than 
that ju;;~ described for the modern West; so much so that the relevance of 
the very notion of public administration could appear questionable. To Ibn 
Sa'ud, whose death occurred as recently as 1953, th~e was no difference 
between private and public funds and his administration,. highly successful, 
was a family affair. 
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This example should suffice to suggest that we must account for a 
wide range of positions in distinguishing between the private and the public 
sphere, and consequently for a wide range of settings in which public ad-
ministration may, or for that matter may not, occur. Again it requires us to 
consider all that this entails for the nature and modalities of each variant 
of public administration that could thus be distinguished • 
These, then, are two instances of how culture context features as a 
primary determinant for the complex of phenomena with which we are concerned. 
They show ·that we cannot hope to secure a firm grip on this subj ect matter 
unless we account for the cultural mould. in which they occur. Of course, the 
validi ty of this realization is not restricted to these two instances. -It. 
relates to the entire field.·In order to substantiate the argument, two more 
ins tances may be quoted, however brieflY. One is the spat:iotetlfPl?ra:r .. frame-
work,the other is.authority. 
Consider the spatiotemporal framework, not merely of public administration 
but indeed of life. Ever since public administration experts and scholars 
have developed an interest in ecology, this m~.tter has· attracted attention. 
(Not.e in passing that the ecological vogue represents, to an extent, the 
kind of approach - starting from culturally conditioned specificity- that 
is here being advocated; but note also that due to the strange shift in 
meaning that the word ecology has undergone in being adopted for this meta-
phorical usage, its full implications remain, by and large-, to be envisaged.) 
Once again, the possible differences in appreciation of· the spatio-
temporal . universe, according to culture, are legion as a matter of· principle. 
Once again, a possible way to account.for them more. or less categorically 
(which is· still a. far cry from accounting for each specifically) is to envisage 
a typological range that could en~ompass all of them, considered from one 
selected viewpoint (leaving the possibility of other viewpoints). This range, 
in its tur.n, can be cOT,1veniently cqnceived as two extreme positions plus 
everything in between. . 
Let me illustrate this with exclusive reference to time., ·whilst tacitly 
assuming that the same, mutatis mutandis, is possible in respect of space. 
The human perception of time has two components, one apparently· the. logical 
opposite of the other. There is, on the one hand, a perception in. terms of 
time flow and on the other hand,a perception in terms of moment of time, 
event. The two are equally valid, but logically speaking they cannot be 
matched. Btill they can feature as the two extreme positions of a typological 
range. This range in its turn will comprise an infinite number of mixes of 
the two perceptions. The mixes will· accord more preponderance to the one and 
relatively less to the other, and vice versa. Any such mix can subsequently 
be rendered '. in more specific, time-and-place-conditioned, terms· •. Indeed 
there will be room, within this framework, for subsidiary·typologies, intro-
ducing additional distinctive criteria. At the same time, it should prove 
useful for the purpose of eliminating typologies that, for one reason or an-
other,. are spurious or misconstrued.· 
Doubtlessly, development administration will be one thing if the under-. 
lying perception of time is near one extreme of this range, and something 
else if it approaches the other.· For· example, according to the modern Western 
perception (which is about to be modified significantly due to the upsurge of 
instant mediated communication), the conception of time in terms of discrete 
events is fully subordinate to that in terms of time flow. As a result, the 
act, that is the moment, of planning will fit - in a properly subservient, 
yet nonetheless determining, role - in a clearly perceivedan,d effectively 
calculated time flow, present as well as future. On the other hand,in the 
classicistic setting of the traditional Middle East, based as it is on 
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temporal atomism, the model for the future is given as a fact of the past. 
The result is that there, the present moment is basically no more than a 
momentary - if perhaps for all practical purposes ongoing - act of re-creation: 
an act of moulding a (near) future that is fundamentally known for what 
it should be. -
The other instance refers to authority and its exertion. Again, differences 
flowing from different cultural parameters need to be accounted for at the 
outset. ,Again, typological ranges ,may serve as a first categorical approxi-
mation, to ,the exercise needed. Again, these ranges can be construed setting 
out from two extreme positions that will have been distinguished, initially, 
in the manner of 'privative opposition or binarity. In this case, we shall' 
complicate matters somewhat by suggesting that not merely one typological 
range is needed, but at least two. This suggestion will help to realize the 
pluridimensionality of phenomena such as the ones we are 'concerned with-. 
Considered from one viewpoint, instances of authority can be rendered 
intelligible by distributing them across a typological range that runs from 
"directing" (i.e., issuing directives and having them implemented) all the, , 
way through "umpiring" (or, with a fashionable term, "brokerage", i.e., pro-
moting the emergence of a direction, a -course to steer, out of a currently 
available assortment of tendencies, expectations and the like). Considered 
from a quite different yet equally relevant viewpoint, insta)J.ces of authority 
can be rendered intelligible by distributing'them across a typological range 
running all the way from presupposed homogeneity to presupposed complexity" 
of the sociocultural entity, or polity, in which it operates. Here and there, 
the two ranges will intersect, Le., prove mutually relevant; but that is a 
matter of coincidence. Of more immediate importance for present purposes is 
Lhe realization that it will make a great deal of difference for the type of 
authority that can be exerted, and the way in which it will be exerted, whether 
the U.S.A" or for that matter Israel or 'Nigeria, will be conceived as a 
pluri-:ethuic or as an ethnically homogenous society or polity. 
At this point, the necessity of accounting for culturally conditioned speci-
ficity and diversity in phenomena like public administration has been suffi-:-
ciently argued. It has also been made abundantly clear that in order to do so 
we shall,have to get ready for exercises of considerable proportions. What 
should be added, in an attempt to afford some relief, is that the same 
exercise should help to avoid some of the spurious problems that currently 
beset the discipline. . 
Again, one example will have to do. In public administration as in 
most other social sciences, there always is a good deal of discussion, indeed 
of confusion, about values. Values will be introduced as more 'or less ultimate 
determinants, in sequences cifregression of the kind already mentioned. It 
should be clear that, had cultural specificity been accounted for at the out-
set, the need to refer to values could not occur. Thus a big burden would ,be 
taken off our shoulders. ' 
What should prove necessary, as well as feasible, instead, in a frame-
work of -development administration, would be to identify specific develop-
ment goals, as emerging in a specific development situation. This is an 
exercise'in it own right; we cannot undertake it here. 2 . 
The gist of the argument thus far can be stated as follows. It is incorrect 
to consider comparative public administration as an ultimate, perhaps not 
2. Compo "On the Identification of Development Goals", Development and Change 
1/1, The Hague 1969, pp. 3-20. 
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quite foreseen, outgrowth of the involvement of public administration experts 
in increasingly more ,and ever different situations, amongst them situations , 
of needed development. The proper -'JJ.ay ta consijfer it is as an at,temptto meet 
some of the basic requirements of responsib;I.e scholarship in, today' s One 
World, and thus as a conditio sine qua non for valid theorizing in the dis-
cipline. -- ----
Of course this is not how comparative administration came into existence. 
It emerged as an afterthought and as an attempted remedy. There was, and is, 
trouble. Theory, of an assumedly general nature, was being applied to ever 
more and always different situations, in which the need for effective ad-
ministration was felt. But the application ran into difficul,ties, some of " 
them unforeseen and many of ,them not easily iden"a;b1e by means of' the existing 
body of theory. In the quest for "ecology", what is really raised is the 
issue of the relevance of existing theory to actual conditions; but the 
manner in which it is done appears like putting the cart before the horse. 
It leaves theory intact, in the pious assumption that its generality is in-
disputable. What it might do instead is raise the question about theory's 
relevance, and thereby probe into the specificity of theory and its ensuing 
limitations. Comparative public administration does roughiy the same for 
theory as the ecological concern does. What should occupy us is whether, 
together, they will do enough. 
Hurdles that need to be taken 
It is not at all certain that they will. The present state of the discipline -
and not merely of this discipline in the social sciences - causes concern. 
It cannot be taken for granted that such new developments as the ecological 
concern and comparative administration will constitute a sufficient response 
to the ,challenge of the moment. There are in particular two major drawbacks, 
unresolved for all I can see, that urge caution. One is our ,inherited mode 
of conceptualization that public' administration share~ in common with socio-
logy, political science, and one or two more. The other is the matter of 
nature and degree of self-entrenchment - a term that needs explanati,on. 
First, on the inherited mode of conce~tualization. This is a matter well 
beyond the present, scope. Rather than omitting it, however, we must resort 
to oversimplification', 
The concepts used in social sC:iences like socidiogy, political science" 
and public administration are less than optimally useful for such contemporary 
purposes as the increasing concern with development problems. They are , 
situe et date; they belong intrinsically to a place and a time with different 
preoccupations and different needs than ours, and with a different perception 
of sociocultural reality. Seen against the backdrop of our period of world 
history and its needs and urges, many of them are primitive. 
Most of the concepts currently in use are inappropriate for contemporary 
purposes, on two counts. First, they are general in a peculiar way. They are 
categorical, and they are timeless and placeless labels, applied not so much 
to phenomena or entities as to essences of a virtually Platonic purity and 
non-reality. They refer to absolute qualities. 
Secondly, whilst being all that they were just said to be, these con-
cepts are 'ncn¢theless derivatives from fullblooded, time-and-place-conditioned, 
real specificity. Such pure generality as they are claimed to,possess has 
been arrived at through a distillation process, the two main ingredients of 
which are abstraction and generalization perforce. The most astonishing 
thing about them is ,perhaps, that the claim has be€m upheld hitherto. How has 
, "" ."t .... 
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that been done? By means of a device that blinds the eye to the inherent, 
basic deficiencies; a device naturally and unconsciously applied by all 
those - that is, all of us - who have been taken in. The matter is really 
very simple. The place-and-time that conditions these notions is our own 
place and our own time (or at least that of the founding fathers of our • 
disciplines, with whom we do, as a rule, identify). Thus we are in a position 
to generalize at no extra cost, simply by failing, as we. readily would, to 
realize that our place and our time ate.: not all places and all times.· By 
omitting to state explicitly the referents of our concepts - a tedious thing 
to repeat every time anyway - we arrive at concepts that will not sound 
any warnings when we call them general. What is more, by thus appearing as 
beyond the pale of spatiotemporal specificity, they are at the same time 
beyond temporal identifiability. Not only are they not dynamic: they are not 
static either. That, however, will not absolve them from being tinged in 
common usage. Since they are oftentimes.applied vis-a-vis a reality that is 
alarming precisely because it is unstable, these eternal, categorical con-
cepts will easily, if injustifiably, appear static: Tlje end result is that 
we are dealing with change and development in basically static terms. 
This can be summed up in one instance; and I shall apologize in ad-
vance for sounding sacrilegious; whicp it is not my intention to be~ As much 
of the current literature in public administration, sociology and political 
science, indicates, Max Weber is still regarded as a - not to say, the -
founding father, to whose inexhaustible genius all of us must refer time 
and again for inspiration. Yet it is not difficult to argue that his ideal 
type concepts ,are half-way houses between historical-descriptive and analytical 
categories, and that his efforts to expand from European into alien cultures 
werewell.-iri.tended but largely abortive for lack of accurate information and 
again for lack of readiness to assess the significance of such expans'iveness 
per se; Having become the object of a cult, Weber, like Marx,is suffering 
an-increasingly grave injustice; so far as I can judge Weber, unlike Marx, 
did nOt ask for canonization. It is only proper to recognize that the 
founding fathers are now museum pieces. In that capacity, they can continue 
to be useful. Their relevance to the here-and-now is by no means lost, .but 
it is limited and the_limitations need to be assessed carefully. 
We have come-a long way since the founding fathers. Our need is for a 
conceptualization 6f reality, and for a set of basic concepts resultingfuere-
from, that will suffer neither from make-believe generality nor from a 
purity that is utterly lacking. in realism. Ours is One World, whether we like 
it or not. Our society and culture interact, increasingly and at times dis-
quietingly, with other societies and cultures; this interaction is here to 
stay and, perhaps, to increase. We live not sO~-Il1uch in the. present as towards 
the future, in haste. We experience today' s events primarily inasmuch as 
they mould the "livability" of tomorrow. It is time for us to recognize that 
generality of concepts is perhaps more remote from us than we were brought 
up to believe - and accordingly more elusiv~. It is also time 'for Us to 
design and use: more complex conceptual propositions, in which generality and 
specificity are both, and ~qually, crucial,- n9twithstanding the fact that, 
by our traditional perception, they are mutually exclusive. Again, it is 
time for us to recognize time for what it is, whether as time flow or as 
sequence of moments or - second oppositional combination - both. We can no 
longer afford to be kept from the task before us by an overdose of piety 
for the founding fathers. 
The second drawback, closely interwoven with the first, is self-entre~t:hment. 
I submit that any scholar is subject to the cumulative effect of two' 
variants of self-entrenchment, the one societal" the other disciplinary. 
';:.;. 
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By self-entrenchment I mean one aspect of the manifestation of a distinct 
sociocultural entity (of whatever description). It is a product pf the inner 
. secretion of identity. ·It is an intrinsic ingredient of the complex of factors 
that sets me apart from you, us from them, blacks from whites, those under-
developed from those developed. 
Societal self-entrenchment is quite well known, but it goes under a 
different name, which re~ers specifically to some of its implications. The 
name is ethnocentrism. The matter was referred to earlier in discussing 
generalization on the basis of the here-and-now.The most often noted illustra-
tion is the word that the ancient Greeks used in referring to others -
"barbarians", stammerers. The others did not speak properly, they were not 
properly civilized; by consequence they were barely human. Basically, they 
do nO.t exist: they are beyond .the pale o·fthe universe, . "our" universe of 
civilized mankind. If "we".doinot know them, that is because we are a pr:lori 
absolved from having, or trying, to know them, there being nothing there 
that could be worth knowing. 
Of course, what applies basically may yet fail to apply factually. 
Under certain conditions, "we" cannot help rubbing shoulders'with"them" 
more or less frequently or eve.n regularly. Such conditions, however, will be 
interpreted by "us" as constituting a necessity for "them" to conform to 
the true pattern of life which, no doubt, is ours. It is typical of Western 
civilization that it should have carried this tendency even further. For . 
centuries, part of the Western self-assertion and self-vindication has been 
effectuated in a confrontation with aliens whom Westerners have gone out of 
their way to seek. The result is a curious ambiguity. We Westerners seek to 
know the alien, to the point where we can chal~enge him by positing our-
selves as a mirror and a yardstick for .him to ·consider. There is a tacit 
underlying assumption involved in this that deserves to be expo,sed. Confronting 
the alien in this manner means going out into unmapped 'territory, and 
taking care of the mapping in the process. The alien becomes ,known .to us 
by virtue of our mapping, - that is, appearing within a set 6f co-ordinates 
imposed by us. We are unable to envisage him but through ourselves. 'Ethnocen-
trism enwraps us as a vicious circle. 
To confound the matter further, some Westerners engage upon the mapping 
without considering whether other Westerners have preceded them. In public 
administration, as in social sciences in general, it is disconoerting to see 
authors en'ter what they assume to be terra incognita, unconcerned about the 
wealth of information that may be readily available thanks to earlier efforts 
of scholars of other disciplines. For example, the mutual aloofness between 
orientalists and social scientists during the 'fifties and 'sixties is little 
short of scandalous. The sad result is that without real need an emerging 
field like development administration will show a tendency to· feed upon itself, 
opinions of authors having to substitute for established but ignored facts, 
and alien informants being approached with questions which it is only hoped 
will make sense to them. 
This ominous state of affairs is the outcome of disciplinary entrench-
ment enforced by societal entrenchment. We mentioned social sciences versus 
oriental studies and related historical-philological disciplines. We could 
also mention the difficulties of communication between one social science 
and other social sciences. Take development. For reasons that"do not matter 
here, economics is leading. It has defined what development is about, what 
are its goals, how they can be achieved. On the whole, it has been success-
ful; but not to the extent that economists would not want to" do still better. 
To this purpose, theu. will challenge professionals of other social sciences 
to join. As a /rule, attempts to respond to the challenge end in mutual dis- " 
appointment. Those of the other fields cannot join without taking the entire 
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matter of development back to square one; which is not what they were in-
vited for. , 
Public administration, notably development administration, is caught in' 
the midd~e of all this. It has its full share of disciplinary self-entrench-' 
ment and its professionals carry their inevitable burden of societal self-
entrenchment. Besides, in the matter of development it is bound to hurt it-
self against the self-entrenchment of some other disciplines. In a somewhat 
rash response to the latter, public administration experts have at times been 
tempted to consider development administration not as a segmentary but rather 
as a pars pro toto device to deal with development, - with little real result. 
For them and for-ill their colleagues, the matter seems by and large un-
resolved. But as concern about, it will mount, the effort towards a solution 
is botind to increase. ' , 
TiJ;e challenge -of aevel-opment;--
The preceding paragraph introduced the "last point of this paper, - development 
and the place and role of public administration in its regard. 
~his is not the occasion for a discussion of the basic issue, namely 
what really is development. Enough has been said, however, to warn against 
any assumption that Westerners, and amongst these the scholars of particular 
disciplines, have the secret. 
Like administration, development is a term that disguises the fundamental 
differences between action and process, between inputs by distinct individuals 
or groups and goings-on in the framework of a human aggregate. Again, ,it blurs 
the distinction between a given aspect or segment of reality and the theory 
or insight relating to it. 
This state of affairs leads to confusion in all the social sciences, 
but public administration is liable to suffer more from it than the others. 
This is for two reasons. 
First~ the degree of politicization typical of most of the third world. 
This will inevitably turn the notion politics into a pars pro toto indication 
of public affair's, not to say of sociocultural reality. In consequence, ad-
ministration 'may appear as the decisive procedure for initiating and steering 
development. A glorious prospect to some, it is bound to appear as a Big 
Brother nightmare to others. In neither manifestation does it seem very 
realis'tic. . 
Second, the, circumstance that a good deal of public administration -
and a fortiori of development administration - theory hinges on the notion 
,of bureaucracy. Bureaucracy is one of those time-and-place-conditioned phe-
nomena which, thanks to (undue and unwarranted) abstraction and generalization 
have come to occupy centre stage and, in so doing, exer't a distorting impact. 
At root, the bureaucracy could not be more than one peculiar kind of insti-
tution~l incumbent of (a number of elements of) the administrative role and 
function. ,In a development perspective, it is only too natural for the change 
agent - whatever that may be - to appear virtually or fully synonymous with 
the bureaucracy. The result is that the,bureaucracy comes close to featuring 
as the "mQuq,polist of development. Add to this thevirtualidentity,in 
numerous contemporary situations, between state and bureaucracy, pl~s the 
effects of the overall politicization just referred to, and a fiendishly rigid 
state of affairs will result that, in addition to other evil things, is 
almost bound to be quite anti-developmental in its orientation and, operation. 
The main cause for such an unfortunate outcome - it must be repeated - is 
the impossibility, under the given circumstances,to distinguish effectively 
between development as process and development as action. 
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Still, nothing really indicates that public administration is doomed 
by difficulties like these. On the contrary, its chances 'to overcome them 
may well be better than those of some of the other social sciences. Like 
development, it is necessarily processual and operational. Its need to be 
so is more obvious than that of, for example, political science or sociology. 
Relevance, to public administration, is a matter of to be or not to be. 
In a way, its position is quite different from that of economics, where the 
typical 19th century format - pure theory complemented by the 'application 
of theory - is still preponderant in many ways. What matters, it would seem, 
is to realize the difference and to draw the consequences in a forward-:- ' 
looking manner. 
Postscript 
The repeated references tq ,,9.eve,l.Q,P-men:t al;l.,':p,~9.geJ3s I as di,s~inc~ f~Qm .. g~vel.QP-. 
ment as action/,_r.epl;'~sent ,a thr~9-d r~n.ip.Lth,;oug~.o~ ,rather und.~:t::.l!.eath, 
the argument, gevelo.Ped thils far.. 
It is, more or lessI1;dlstbmar,y' t~i·d:'istiI,lgu.h.Jh;;i'ibetwe'em ',;:d.eveloped and 
underdeveloped countries or situati~ns. It is equally customary to envisage 
the desirable history of a given sociocultural entity as a progression from 
less developed to more developed. The two visions are closely related and 
in fact reinforce one another. They are also dated: they originate in 18th 
and 19th century Europe, they belong to the modern (as distinct from the con-
temporary) Western world at large. In spreading - not without significant 
modification - to other parts of the world 'they seem to have passed ,their 
zenith, and to raise more questions than they answer. 
At this paint, the reference is to the"developed-underdeveloped" 
dichotomy as a summary presentation of a highly complex subject matter. We 
have here a binary pair of concepts, thrown together in, such a manner as to 
constitute one device, the purpose of which is to serve, on the one hand, 
as an explanatory framework, a tool for human understanding, and on the 
other .hand, as the starting point for purposive human interfer,ence in the 
goings-on of human polities. The concepts, moreover, are timeless and place-
less, as exposed in the preceding. Enough has been said abbveon the need 
for concepts having basic characteristics other than timelessness and 
placelessness, and on alternative characteristics more suitable for present 
needs. But what has been said regarding binary pairs of concepts and their 
uses remains to be pulled together. 
A considerable amount of thinking, on development and On other complex 
subjects takes shape in basically simplistic constructs where (1) two 
entities or types, categorically indicated" feature as opposite poles, in 
such a manner that (2) they will serve as pegs between which is then (3) 
suspended a time sequence which, in its turn, will (4) double up as a 
sequence of qualitative progression across (5) an undefined number of stages 
of qualitative change (pe.rhaps betterment). The subsequent steps are, in 
most cases, tacitly assumed to occur in consequence of (6) a sequence of 
relevant impulses exerted by humans. For the scholar who has gone this far, 
the problem remains to identify'the impUlses. This is difficult, if not 
impossible. But the real difficulty lies elsewhere. As mentioned, this 
kind of co~struct, in addition to forcing us to deal with change in terms 
that are meant to have nothing to do with change, sets out from a postulated 
mutual exclusivity or polarity between concepts for no other ,purpose than 
subsequently to establish an operational relationship between them. This is 
a self-defeating exercise on both counts. Earlier I submitted ,that our in-
herite,d mode of conceptualizing has become subject to the law of diminishing 
returns. At this point, the reason why should be clear. The dichotomic per-
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ception of reality, which undoubtedly served its purposes at one time, 
cannot serve our present purposes satisfactorily. 
Does this mean that we shall henceforth be 'obliged to refrain. from the 
use, for conceptualization purposes, of pairs of concepts arranged on the 
basis of. privative opposition? To put the matter like this is to phrase the 
ques tion wrong ly, . indeed to jump at eonclus ions. Leaving as ide now the 
matter of timele.ssness and placelessness and the way in which this is to he 
taken care of, it is necessary to stipulate that the challenge that emerges 
from the preceding does not refer to binary pairs of concepts .a$ such,but 
to the dichotomic presentation and usage of 'such pairs. At root, the binary 
pair' of concepts is an exercise in conceptual reduplication. Man, in his 
necessary effort at intellection or und~rstanding, envisages reality. 
Knowingly or unknowingly, he does this under certain specific conditions, 
from a certain angle. One of the results' is a concept that he will henceforth 
use in referring to that instance of reality .. Envisaged under different cir-
cumstances .or from a different angle, the same ins.tance of reality will be. 
referred to by a different concept. So far as their referent is concerned, 
the two concepts should be synonymous; and so they are, but not to the full. 
extent. An element of privative opposition intervenes. The question is what 
significance to attribute to this element. We have been hrought up to say 
"dichotomy", and to take it from there. . 
. We have now reached the point where we are ready to question the 
validity- or, more precisely, the necessity - of this answer. The necessity 
should pe hard to prove. In fact, it is not too difficult to prove that it is 
not necessarily the only answer. In their capacity as tools for intellection, 
concepts are analytic devices. An instance of reality that is referred to 
first by one concept and then by another, is for 'all practical purposes 
analyzed into one and another of its manifestations, aspects,'elements or 
whatever. In order to appreciate its fullness, what would have to be done 
is to reconstitute it out of the several aspects into which it has been 
taken' apart through the act(s) ofcon~eptualization. In othfFr words, the 
relevant concepts have to be brought into some sort of relationship where 
they can feature as mutually cumulative. Whatever 'purposes dichotomy cari 
serve, it cannot serve this one. 
It follows· that the search is on for an alternative to dichotomy. 
Given b{narity, one possibility for this alternative to shape up is in the 
form of complementarity. Two concepts, logically one another's opposites, 
~~e, j9~P.t.1.Y.: ~e~d,~d. to, pr,oy~de __ ~,.g1;~~pq:o,.~ .t.!1~1:. w.i"-~J:}..,:,,,~h~~~;.:!,!:e~!'lt,«:, .. ~,<?nse'J:n~d. 
To understand light, we must envisage it as waves; but we must also understand it as 
particles, - regardless of the fact that what is wave y,annotbe particlE'! and 
vice versa. It is' this model that 'has been. tacitly introduced in the preceding' 
argument, and then elaborated in proposing, repeatedly, analytic devices 
for the study of phenomena of an operational nature: the model 'of two extremes 
(really ek-:'types.that can be approximated asymptotically and no'more) with, in 
between, a'range of variable mixes of the .two. 
